MAIDEN STEEL real world history

[Komissar]

Information about the LRA:

The LRA group was formed in 1987 and is engaged in an armed rebellion against the Ugandan government in what is now one of Africa's longest-running conflicts. It is led by Joseph Kony, who proclaims himself the "spokesperson" of God.

The LRA operates mainly in northern Uganda and also in parts of Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The LRA is currently proscribed as a terrorist organization by the United States.

The LRA has been known by a number of different names, including the Lord's Army (1987 to 1988) and the Uganda Peoples' Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA) (1988 to 1992) before settling on the current name in 1992. They are also sometimes referred to as Lord's Resistance Movement/Army (LRM/A or LRA/M).

Sudan has provided military assistance to the LRA, in response to Uganda lending military support to the Sudan People's Liberation Army.

History:

AFRICOM (or USAFRICOM) is a Unified Combatant Command of the US Department of Defense, responsible for US military operations and military relations with 53 African nations (excepting Egypt). Africa Command was established October 1, 2007, and formally activated October 1, 2008 at a public ceremony at the Pentagon attended by representatives of African nations. It has become clear that the idea was not primarily to fight against the Islamic terror, which was said to be growing in influence, but to protect and help expand American military and economic (mainly energy) interests.

Pending legislation, "The Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 2009," being pushed by Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) would empower AFRICOM not only to give technical support but to physically go to war with the armed groups that both Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo Forces have not been able to dislodge. Royce said:

“Africa's emerging potential as a major oil producer and supplier to the United States, has been of interest to the Sub-Committee on Africa that I've chaired for some time. The sub-committee held a hearing to look at this topic in 2000. It's clearly in our national interest to diversify our energy supply, especially given the turbulent political climate in key parts of the world today. The expansion of energy production in Africa matches to that interest...”

On January 2, 2002, a Washington DC symposium held to discuss African oil came up with a document entitled "African Oil: A Priority for US National Security and African Development," which paved the way for the rest to happen. It was attended by Washington's Africa heavyweights: people like Barry Schutz, a Bush administration specialist on Africa; Lt-Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, a high-ranking Air Force officer, and Water Kansteiner, Bush's under-secretary of State for African Affairs.

We have now definitely entered the aggressive birth of AFRICOM. The man who is put in charge of this task, Gen. William E. "Kip" Ward, is not new to the battlefields of Africa. He was in Somalia in 1993 when US forces were serious bitten by small insurgent groups, forcing the US to withdraw from that crisis.

Take the case of Sudan. Openly, Western governments, including the US, have never been more critical of the regime in Khartoum, even accusing it of committing genocide in Darfur. The fact that the head of Sudan's intelligence agency, wanted by the International Criminal Court, was secretly jetted to the US by the CIA to discuss military interests in the Horn of Africa.

True, there might not be any US troops on the ground—but it is an American war contracted to some Somalis, African Union forces, and Ethiopians. The US has been training intelligence forces, providing surveillance, logistic support and money to buy bullets and guns; and there are even speculations that American forces might provide aerial bombing of militant positions.

This was the case too with "Operation Lightning Thunder" in 2008, involving Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the liberated Southern Sudan. It was clear to all sincere analysts that the Lord's Resistance Army was cornered and pacified, and that operation "Lightning Thunder" was no more than the clearing of the oil fields. Dr. Jendayi Frazer, then an assistant secretary of state in the Bush government, was said to have been the main initiator of that operation. Riek Machar, vice president of Southern Sudan, said as much in a documentary aired by the Al Jazeera TV. Ugandan military commanders have openly confirmed that they have received logistics support from the Americans, including satellite phones, GPS receivers, maps and US contributions to fuel costs of the military vehicles involved in the operation. The results: over 1,000 civilians dead and the internal displacement of an estimated half million people. All this followed the 2006 failed operation by a UN team of US-trained Guatemalan commando to assassinate Joseph Kone, leader of LRA—in which all members of the commando were killed by the LRA. Southern Sudan refused to actively take part, only closing their borders to avoid crossing of arm groups into their territory.

January 16, 2009; after nearly four months of renewed attacks on civilians in central Africa by the Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, efforts to apprehend top rebel commanders responsible for the violence are long overdue. However, ‘Operation Lightning Thunder,’ the joint military operation against the rebel group launched in mid-December by the armies of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Government of Southern Sudan—with the support of the United States—has been poorly executed to date and has so far only made the crisis worse.

Though the offensive has weakened the LRA by cutting off food stores and other supplies, it has also forced the LRA into a familiar position as a highly mobile insurgent force. With the LRA flushed deeper into the jungle, Ugandan forces have lost an important measure of initiative: the LRA knows the tricky terrain better than their adversaries; LRA fighters are able to move and disperse quickly and in small numbers; and the LRA has shown every willingness to loot and pillage to survive. Kony and his key commanders have ordered their forces to retaliate by committing brutal attacks against Congolese civilians. Neither the regional militaries involved nor the international community more broadly has a coherent plan to apprehend top rebel commanders or protect civilians from LRA atrocities.

In 2006, in an unprecedented move, the United Nations mounted a covert operation to capture or kill Joseph Kony. A squad of U.S.-trained Guatemalan Special Ops soldiers set out into Congo's Garamba National Park, a longtime LRA refuge and the scene of the 2008–2009 Garamba offensives. Trained in jungle warfare and accustomed to surviving in the bush for long stretches, the Guatemalans were equipped with M-16s and the latest special-operations technology. But they were no match for Kony and his child warriors. Five LRA soldiers were killed. But not one of the Guatemalans survived. The LRA fighters slaughtered them all and, according to one account, beheaded the commander. The battle, which lasted for several hours, included hand to hand combat. Some reports put the U.N. dead at eight; others say as many as 40 counterinsurgency troops may have died that morning. The LRA left the corpses in the jungle but took the weapons—including heavy machine guns and grenade launchers.

The LRA camps were largely empty of fighters and high-level commanders when struck by Ugandan aircraft, suggesting that either operational security was compromised or the initial intelligence that was used to design the attack was flawed. Moreover, the operation’s failure to cordon off the camps, cut off escape routes, or put in place mechanisms to protect surrounding communities from reprisal attacks before the bombing began indicates poor military planning. Scattered LRA units are now stretched across hundreds of kilometers, able to either conduct hit-and-run attacks against their pursuers or make a push toward a tempting sanctuary in southeastern Central African Republic, or CAR. Also troubling is the limited number of LRA fighters who have voluntarily surrendered. Had the bulk of the LRA rank-and-file really been as demoralized and frustrated as many engaged in the peace process had thought, far more would have taken these attacks as an opportunity to throw down their arms. It is possible many are still hiding and intend to turn themselves in if the opportunity arises, but initial signs are not encouraging. 

 

‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ is still salvageable, but it will require an immediate shift from an open-ended counter-insurgency to a much more targeted and focused mission. The following shifts in strategy and execution are therefore essential to the success of this mission going forward, all of which require greater international engagement: 

 

The LRA will continue to commit atrocities so long as Joseph Kony and his top commanders remain at large and able to abduct and indoctrinate new fighters. However, the LRA’s highly centralized hierarchy is one of the rebel group’s key weaknesses. Therefore, it is imperative that the regional militaries focus their efforts on the LRA leadership. ‘Operation Lightning Thunder’ must therefore not devolve further into an open-ended war against the LRA, as tricky as it might be to avoid that scenario given the dispersed nature of the rebels following the aerial assaults.

 

The Ugandan, Congolese, and Southern Sudanese armies face an enormous challenge in trying to secure the region’s vast, difficult terrain with only a relatively small number of troops. The United States, the U.K., and France, as well as U.N. Peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Southern Sudan should provide intelligence and offer technical and logistical support to the regional militaries participating in ‘Lightning Thunder.’ Greater international support should be conditioned on the operation narrowing its goals to target top leaders, while also showing restraint against abductees and protecting civilians from reprisal attacks. With this support, regional forces will be much more effective in identifying the whereabouts of LRA leaders and deploying rapidly to intercept them. Given U.S. monitoring and electronic communications tracking capacities, it is difficult to believe that the United States could not directly assist in pinpointing Kony’s location. 

 

The United States military has strong ties to the Ugandan military and has assets based nearby at the U.S. military base in Djibouti.

“The ongoing operations are targeted because we cannot use means that may inflict a heavy toll on the local populations.”

There will be no more talks between the Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels, the commander of the land forces, Lt. Gen. Katumba Wamala, has said.

Katumba made the remarks while addressing an African Union (AU) technical team at the army headquarters in Mbuya on Friday.

He said all that was left was for the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, to sign the peace agreement that was drawn in 2008.

“Uganda has never closed the door to peace. Kony can come out and sign the comprehensive peace agreement and if there is someone who thinks he can convince him to come out of the bush, we welcome him,” Katumba said.

He said the UPDF would use force to defeat the rebels.

Lt. Col. Felix Kulaigye, the force’s spokesperson, said the team, led by Col. Mar Mbow, was in the country to discuss ways of ending the LRA conflict.

The AU team comprised the head of the Government of Southern Sudan Secretariat, James Reat Gony and the SPLA deputy chief of staff for operations, Lt. Gen Wilson Deng.

The UPDF team comprised the chief of military intelligence (CMI), Brig James Mugira and the UPDF chief of legal services, Col Ramadhan Kyamulesire.

Katumba said the force appreciates AU’s recognition of LRA as not only a regional problem but an international one.

He informed the visiting team that LRA was breathing its last; although a lot had to be done to deny the rebels any chance of regrouping.

Mugira said the joint operation, Lightening Thunder, which was launched against LRA after the peace talks hit a dead end, had registered enormous achievements, the major one being achieving the regional (joint) approach to the problem.

Mugira said this sent a clear signal that there were possibilities of joint operations against groups which cause chaos in the region.

He said the operation destroyed five LRA permanent bases in Congo. It also broke the rebels’ communication channels.

Mugira said the rebels were communicating by courier, had lost command and that a number of their senior commanders had been killed.

“By March 9, 426 LRA rebels had been killed, while 68 had been captured alive,” said Mugira.

He said another 129 rebels had surrendered due to pressure from the same operation.

The CMI chief also said 738 civilians from Uganda, Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic had been rescued.

It is almost 24 years since Kony started his movement to fight President Yoweri Museveni’s NRM government, basing in northern Uganda.

He began by recruiting former soldiers from around Gulu, but later changed to abducting youth whom he trained into fighters.

Thousands of people from northern Uganda, South Sudan and eastern Congo, have died in the insurgency and hundreds have been displaced.

Consequently, the UPDF, with support from South Sudan and Congo, launched a military offensive through which it bombarded an LRA camp in eastern Congo.

 

 

Additional links below:

AFRICOM and the USA's hidden battle for Africa - LINK

NO EXCUSES: The end of the LRA is in sight -LINK

Military Operations have weakened the LRA - LINK

You Tube Video: DR Congo civilians caught in fighting Jan, 26th 2009 - LINK